Pre-implantation genetic diagnosis, tissue typing and beyond: the legal implications of the Hashmi case.
The legality of pre-implantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) has recently been confirmed by the Court of Appeal in the Hashmi case, based on a purposive construction of the statute. The court went on to declare tissue typing lawful and strained the wording of the statute in order to do so. The Hashmi case confirms that it would be lawful for the HFEA to license tissue typing in the absence of PGD. However, the HFEA only licenses tissue typing where PGD is also indicated, on the basis of a blanket application of the welfare of the child test set out in S 13 (5). This policy can be criticised. Firstly, a blanket approach to S 13 (5) is not appropriate. Secondly, the HFEA is applying the test too strictly when compared to the 'best interests' test which would govern the situation were an existing child to be a potential donor. Thirdly, by licensing tissue typing in the Hashmi case, where it was the primary reason for testing, the HFEA has undermined the argument that it can be justified only in cases where it is ancillary to PGD. These arguments, coupled with human rights arguments, based on Art 8 and Art 12, could be used to challenge the legitimacy of the HFEA's policy. The restriction on tissue typing to cases where PGD is also indicated is not ethically justified. It offers the same direct benefit to the embryo as PGD, namely selection for implantation. PGD does not cure the relevant condition so offers no additional benefit in a causative sense. Moreover, the Kantian injunction against treating people solely as means is not breached where the child will be wanted for its own sake, as well as for its potential as a cord blood donor.